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• Response to Jones: “Never mind religion, how about desecration?”
  Ryk James, Stephen Leadbeatter
  Published on: 13 December 2017
• Never mind religion, how about desecration?
  Imogen Jones
  Published on: 13 December 2017

• Published on: 13 December 2017

  Response to Jones: “Never mind religion, how about desecration?”

  • Ryk James, Forensic Pathologist Cardiff University
  • Other Contributors:
    • Stephen Leadbeatter, Forensic Pathologist

  We are intrigued by, and sympathetic toward, Dr Jones’ argument; we had approached our argument from the existing case law rather than from the fundamental position that dissection without good reason is morally unacceptable. We can understand that that position is supported by the need for appropriate consent in circumstances outwith a coroner’s jurisdiction. We would agree that invasive dissection that serves no defined purpose cannot be consonant with autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice.

  Conflict of Interest:
  None declared.

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• Published on: 13 December 2017

  Never mind religion, how about desecration?

  • Imogen Jones, Associate Professor in Law University of Leeds

  In their article considering the relationship between Articles 8 and 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and coronial autopsies, Leadbeatter and James argue that recourse to invasive autopsy ought only to be made after an ‘issues based’ investigation establishes that this is necessary. This stands in stark contrast to current practice.

  Whilst Leadbeatter and James write to report their own research findings and discuss the decision in R (Rotsztein) v HM Senior Coroner for Inner London North, I was prompted to consider whether they were too restrained in their conclusions. My primary concern is that whilst redress to the ECHR may be legally and rhetorically attractive, it means that outcomes are dependent on the still living taking action. This may, or may not, promote the deceased person’s preferred course of action.

  Prior to addressing this point in more detail, however, a brief mention to the necessity of invasive autopsies where a death occurs in suspicious circumstances. Leadbeatter and James discuss this; I found their discussion of ‘injury’ (Box 2, Issue 4) particularly interesting. They give the example of road or train deaths, where their approach was to first review evidence from the scene, take toxicology samples and remove trace evidence. Another example might be where a person is shot in the head at close range, the events being caught on CCTV. These examples highlight that even in extreme circumstances evisceration of the body m...

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  In their article considering the relationship between Articles 8 and 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and coronial autopsies, Leadbeatter and James argue that recourse to invasive autopsy ought only to be made after an ‘issues based’ investigation establishes that this is necessary. This stands in stark contrast to current practice.

  Whilst Leadbeatter and James write to report their own research findings and discuss the decision in R (Rotsztein) v HM Senior Coroner for Inner London North, I was prompted to consider whether they were too restrained in their conclusions. My primary concern is that whilst redress to the ECHR may be legally and rhetorically attractive, it means that outcomes are dependent on the still living taking action. This may, or may not, promote the deceased person’s preferred course of action.

  Prior to addressing this point in more detail, however, a brief mention to the necessity of invasive autopsies where a death occurs in suspicious circumstances. Leadbeatter and James discuss this; I found their discussion of ‘injury’ (Box 2, Issue 4) particularly interesting. They give the example of road or train deaths, where their approach was to first review evidence from the scene, take toxicology samples and remove trace evidence. Another example might be where a person is shot in the head at close range, the events being caught on CCTV. These examples highlight that even in extreme circumstances evisceration of the body may add little by way of useful information.

  This leads to my more substantive concern. That is, that grounding the argument against routine invasive autopsy in the rights to freedom of religion and/or family life risks minimising wider sentiments felt regarding the treatment of deceased bodies. I have argued (see I Jones, A Grave Offence: Corpse Desecration and the Criminal Law (2017) Legal Studies (Online first)) that it is an objective moral wrong to act in a way that is disrespectful towards a cadaver. The objectivity here stems from the almost universal commitment to the deceased body as, to quote Feinberg, a ‘sacred symbol’ of the ante-mortem person. This transcends religious adherence, cultural mores and familial relationships. We only need look to the responses to the organ retention scandals to see that religion alone is not responsible for the feeling that an, albeit scientifically, mutilated body is one which has been irreparably desecrated.

  Leadbeatter and James’ findings therefore prompt the question, does the current approach of regular recourse to invasive autopsy violate wider social norms? If, as they argue, many of these procedures are unnecessary (in the sense of enabling the Coroner to discharge his duty and/or obtaining evidence to facilitate an effective criminal investigation) then it strikes me that when these autopsies are carried out, there is a strong case that invasive autopsies constitute acts of disrespect. Thus, in such circumstances an easily avoidable moral wrong is being committed against both the living and the dead.

  Without religious doctrine to fall back on, at a time of shock and grief, and in the face of medical and legal authority, many people will not feel able to challenge the decision to order an invasive autopsy. Leadbeatter and James’ results suggest that change can, and should, come from within the medical profession. My feeling is that this ought to happen sooner rather than later; pathology could do without further public outcry.

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  Conflict of Interest:
  None declared.

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