Preparedness and Response to Bioterrorism

doi:10.1053/jinf.2001.0906

Journal of Infection

Volume 43, Issue 2, August 2001, Pages 104-110

https://doi.org/10.1053/jinf.2001.0906 Get rights and content

Abstract

As we enter the 21st century the threats of biological warfare and bioterrorism (so called asymmetric threats) appear to be more real than ever before. Historical evidence suggests that biological weapons have been used, with varying degrees of success, for many centuries. Despite the international agreements to ban such weapons, namely the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1975 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, there is no effective international mechanism for challenging either the development of biological weapons or their use. Advances in technology and the rise of fundamentalist terror groups combine to present a significant threat to western democracies. A timely and definitive response to this threat will require co-operation between governments on a scale never seen before. There is a need for proper planning, good communication between various health, home office, defence and intelligence agencies and sufficient financial support for a realistic state of preparedness. The Department of Health has produced guidelines for responding to real or suspected incidents and the Public Health Laboratory Service (PHLS) has produced detailed protocols to inform the actions required by microbiologists and consultants in communicable disease control. These protocols will be published on the Department of Health and PHLS web sites.

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^f1: Address all correspondence to: Dr. R. C. Spencer, Bristol Public Health Laboratory, Level 8, Bristol Royal Infirmary, Marlborough Street, Bristol BS2 8HW, UK

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Review ArticlePreparedness and Response to Bioterrorism

Abstract

Lancet

Agents of biological warfare

Rev Med Microbiol

Biological warfare in the 21st Century: biotechnology and the proliferation of biological weapons

Health aspects of chemical and biological weapons

The economic impact of a bioterrorist attack

Emerging Infect Dis

A large community outbreak of salmonellosis caused by intentional contamination of restaurant salad bars

JAMA

The Tokyo subway sarin attack: disaster management, parts 1–3, community, hospital, national and international responses

Acad Emerg Med

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Br Med J

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Science

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ACP News

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Annals NY Acad Sci

Japanese biological warfare research on humans: a case study of microbiology and ethics

Annals NY Acad Sci

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Review Article
Preparedness and Response to Bioterrorism